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STUDY
PROJECT

INTERNATIONAL POWER AND ITS CONTROL

BY

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
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INTERNATIONAL POWER AND ITS CONTROL

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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This paper identifies the current system of international relations. It discusses challenges to that system that may cause it to fail or change. A future system of international relations is forecasted which is an evolutionary development of the current system. It concludes the failure of past systems of international relations were in most cases due to a limited understanding of the expanding nature of power. Therefore, a broadened definition of power is advanced. Finally a new international organizational structure is proposed, designed to effectively use all the elements of power, to meet the challenges of the future.

INTERNATIONAL POWER AND ITS CONTROL

A major change in the global system of international relations has occurred as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between the end of World War II and the demise of the Cold War, the system of international relations operated under a form of power balance commonly referred to as a bi-polar system.¹ Two great superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, controlled the international system militarily, economically, politically, and ideologically. The end of both the Cold War and the bi-polar system did not mean the end of international politics. The "basic rules" of international relations endure, requiring nation states to interact and resolve conflict.² However, it is clear that nations will be required to rely on new systems of international relations to facilitate future interaction.

This paper identifies the major characteristics of the current system of international relations and discusses some of the major challenges to that system. It attempts to forecasts a future system of international relations that allows for the simultaneous operation of a U.S. military hegemony and a multi-polar balance of power system in the economic and political arenas. Some of the major questions addressed are, what forces operate to forestall such dramatic change? How can states avoid mistakes during this period of transition? What are some of the cultural and economic problems affecting international relations that may lead to future instability and conflict? What role do "weapons states" play in this struggle, and how can the U.S. control them?

This paper suggests that one of the main reasons for the failure of various systems of international relations in the past has been a limited definition of the elements of power. This paper suggests an expanded definition of power. Finally, an alternative military and economic organizational structure is proposed to deal with the hybrid system of international relations of the future. This organization could provide a mechanism for the successful application of power on a global scale.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POWER

Over time, various systems of international relations have attempted to limit the destructive use of power by nation states to gain territory, security, prestige, or wealth. None has been very successful for long. Three systems of international relations have been used: the balance of power system, including bi-polar and multi-polar systems; the hegemonic or uni-polar system; and the collective security system. The balance of power system with its intrigue and alliances, the hegemonic system with its dominant power, and the collective security system with its global perspective, have all failed to successfully control the international environment in that none has prevented major wars.³ The community of nations has been unable to provide long-lasting worldwide stability, peace, and prosperity within the bounds of any one of these systems.

The current system of international relations lacks central authority. It depends upon treaties, agreements, alliances, and

coalitions between nation states. To be successful mechanisms these have traditionally relied upon military power, and they operate as "power control" mechanisms. When nation states attempt to increase power in order to exert greater control over their environment, they risk destabilizing the very power relationships they are trying to stabilize. Power has always been the essence of international politics and, therefore, control of power is of paramount importance to system stability.

The question becomes what is real or effective power -- military power, economic power, political power? It seems there are multiple answers. Any power control system attempts to operate and direct the entire range of elements of power, from "hard" or determinate elements to the "cloudlike" or "soft" indeterminate elements. The "hard" power determinants like the number of infantry divisions, the degree of natural resources, industrial capacity, or the size of a national population, are easier to measure and catalog than are the "soft" powers like technology, culture, educational levels, transportation system efficiencies, and mass communication capabilities.

In the past, politicians, economists, and statesmen have tended to capture only a portion of the full spectrum of all aspects of real power influencing the interaction between nation states.⁴ In the new world order, the "soft", "cloudlike" forms of power are beginning to make their presence known, contributing incalculably to the geopolitical equation. As nations begin to use power to influence other states, a "balanced mutual" dependence

tends to develop rather than the commonly accepted concept of interdependence.⁵

The nation states that are able to manipulate the use of these new elements of power can obtain goals ordinarily impossible to achieve with a base of military power alone. The "soft" powers of the U.S. are increasingly the source of its growing power, multiplying its political, military and economic influence. The United States's effective use of "soft" powers has altered the overall global power equation in its favor.

The proof of power lies not only in a nation's resources, but also in that nation's ability to change the behavior of other states. The successful equation is as follows: A nation's willingness to act equals leadership, which equals influence, and, when both are combined with the effective use of all the elements of power, the desired goals are achieved. How these powers are used and the number of nation states possessing them determines the operating system of international relations.

HEGEMONY--THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

This writer's perspective is that the world is currently operating in an hegemonic or uni-polar system of international relations. The United States is the dominant power, is unchallenged militarily, and remains the largest and most productive economic power in the world.⁶ In addition, there is a renewed interest in the U.S. ideological basis, provoking a very real and growing cultural influence.

U.S. hegemony was not the scenario predicted by many theorists. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, most observers predicted that a multi-polar power structure would develop, involving such nation states as China, Japan, Germany, and Russia along with the United States. "According to this thinking, the world was dividing into trading blocs which would be constantly tempted to construct protective trade barriers to keep out foreign products. No one or even two powers would dominate: it would be a sort of economic free-for-all."⁷ The result would be a world where all political decisions were determined by multi-polar economic considerations.

There were some who disagreed. Richard Nixon provided this different point of view:

Those who propound the irrelevance of military power vastly overstate the influence of economic power. The world's rising economic giants--Germany and Japan--have exploited their huge foreign exchange reserves and industrial competitiveness. They have gained control of foreign markets, dominated key bilateral trade relationships, and have set the pace for the economic integration of Europe and the Pacific rim. But on political and security issues, economic power does not amount to geopolitical leverage. The collapse of communism in East Germany, rather than Berlin's economic payoffs to Moscow, led to the unification of Germany. Despite Germany's and Japan's critical need for Gulf oil for economic survival, both countries were impotent in the Gulf crisis, totally dependent on the United States and our allies in the Persian Gulf War to protect their interests. Saddam Hussein after all could not have been bribed to leave Kuwait.⁸

This kind of disagreement is indicative of the current debate among political scientists. It appears, however, that the relative importance of a nation's economic power has increased relative to the importance of its military power. Japan and Germany are

effective players in the world's markets, and they use this power to deftly improve their political position. Their economic policies and trade practices have the ability to alter the behavior of other nation states, but their lack of military power, and limited cultural influence, severely hampers their global reach and effectiveness.

When national or international security is threatened, a true hegemon must be able to project a combination of all the elements of power to gain a "cumulative" effect. The U.S. is the only nation state capable of doing this. Its ability to consistently combine real military, economic, and cultural pressure to obtain desired outcomes insures stability within the system and enhances its hegemonic position reciprocally. The failure of Communism left the United States as the only remaining "full service" superpower and the undisputed leader of the world. Colin Powell recently described the U.S. position as follows:

"No other nation on earth has the power we possess. More important, no other nation on earth has the trusted power that we possess. We are obligated to lead. If the free world is to harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that our great victory in the Cold War has offered us, America must shoulder the responsibility of its power. The last best hope of earth has no other choice. We must lead".⁹

What about the economic power of the United States? Is it declining, expanding, or simply maintaining its position relative to other nation's economies? Is the U.S. economy strong enough to withstand the onslaught of revived economic powerhouses, such as Japan and Germany? A true hegemonic power must possess overwhelming economic power in order to influence nations to behave

the way it wants. The commonly perceived decline of the U.S. economy based on either historical precedence or compared to the European Community and Japan is inaccurate. The U.S. economy has the highest overall productivity rate of any nation. It has doubled its Gross National Product (GNP) since 1960. It produces 8 times the GNP of Germany and 4 times the GNP of Japan. Per capita imports between Japan and the U.S. are approximately equal, averaging about \$2,000 per person. "Of approximately a thousand major multinational corporations, about a third of the largest are U.S.-based. U.S. overseas investment amounts to almost one and a half trillion dollars, fully 30 per cent of the world's trade....overseas trade has risen to just short of 30 per cent of the U.S. GNP, compared to less than 10 per cent in 1950."¹⁰

The U.S. produced 40 to 45 percent of the Gross World Product (GWP) in the late 1940s and early 1950s, due to the destruction of Japan and Germany. That share declined rapidly reaching approximately 25 percent of the GWP by the mid 1960s as other nations recovered from WWII. This percentage slowly increased to approximately 27 percent in 1990.¹¹ As a comparative example, the British Empire at the peak of its power never achieved 25 percent of the GWP.

While the 4.1 trillion dollar debt of the U.S. is a serious problem, it pales in comparison to the debt-to-infrastructure ratio of many other nation states. Compared to all other national economies, the U.S. economy may not have a characteristically hegemonic power, but it continues to maintain a dominate position.

If reactions from various nation states around the world are any indication of power and influence, there is sometimes fear and trepidation that the U.S., a superpower with a penchant for intervention, cannot be controlled by the other "economic" powers. Masao Kunihiro of the Japanese Diet, said that the "feeling that America is a fiercesome country is growing in Japan." In France, there is a growing fear of American imperialism. The foreign minister, Roland Dumas commented that "American might reigns without balancing weight," and Jacques Delor the president of the European Community Commission said the United States must not take charge of the world. There have been calls for the United Nations, and the European Community to try and counter-balance the influence of the United States.¹²

Then there is America's cultural denominator. Around the world there is renewed interest in both the ideology and the culture of the United States. Demonstrators from Russia to China wave books and pamphlets written by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison while protesting their own government's oppression. The U.S. entertainment industry including music, television, information services, films, art, and literature is a major force of social and cultural change in many countries.

The U.S. has achieved a hegemonic position -- politically, economically, and culturally, and is the only country with sufficient assets to be a decisive player in any conflict. Materialist illusions of economic dominance may be gaining some credibility, but economic power is not a sufficient measure of

great power status.¹³ When combined with the "cumulative" effect of power discussed earlier, U.S. willingness to lead is the deciding factor

CHALLENGES TO U.S. HEGEMONY

Can the U.S. maintain its hegemonic position? Due to the tremendous economic and military pressures of maintaining a dominant position, hegemonic systems are notorious for being short-lived. An imbalance of power often drives lesser states into a catch-up mentality that can initiate conflicts that might drain the U.S. of vital economic and military resources if applied over time. One of the major lessons of the bi-polar system of international relations during the last 45 years seems to be that the fewer and more powerful the players in the global system of power, the more stable the system becomes.¹⁴ Stability and security are the desired outcomes of any system of international relations, and the hegemonic system may be best suited to achieve this goal.

If the lesson of the bi-polar system--"fewer powers, greater stability"--is carried to its logical conclusion, one superpower should be able to insure an even greater relative peace. This is not to say that a perfect Kantian "perpetual peace" is attainable. Conflicts will remain, but it may be possible to limit the violent efforts of nations to gain territory or wealth at the expense of others. This would result in fewer vital interests of any single nation being threatened.

Maintaining U.S. hegemony is the only way to insure that cultural and ideological gains made against totalitarianism are not

lost. A new window of political and ideological opportunity is open to the world. At this time, the United States is the only country capable of leading the Western World in a new crusade for the democratic and liberal transformation of the world's citizens and governments.¹⁵ A relatively stable world allows the promotion and development of democratic nation states based on the "rule of law." It is agreed that the development of nation states empowered by their population result in a greater probability of peaceful political and social change. A hegemonic system of international relations is the only one that will have the overwhelming power to permit shifts in the tectonic plates of political and military power short of violence. If U.S. efforts to maintain its hegemonic position are even minimally successful, nation states may have enough time to develop democratic governments supported by free market economies. Powerful states would not fear change knowing prosperity would continue in a stable and secure environment closely monitored by a benevolent dominant power.

Still there are forces challenging the ability of the U.S. to continue as a hegemonic power. Factionalism, dangerous unstable "weapon states", and a resurgent Russia are offered here as examples.

FACTIONALISM:

The most dramatic test of U.S. hegemonic leadership will be managing the forces of factionalism released by the dramatic collapse of Communism. Groups of people united by nationalism, tribalism, religious fundamentalism, or other irredentist forces,

freed from the political control of Communist totalitarianism, are challenging the international status quo. These groups feel that borders and political arrangements forced on them by the Cold War and irrelevant colonial arrangements established by the former Great Powers must be adjusted.¹⁶ A number of wars have begun as groups of people aspire to achieve independence, to gain or regain territory, or to attain ethnic purity through genocide. Most of these wars are of no vital interest to the United States or the Western Democracies, and demand little or no action militarily. There are, however, two exceptions. Because of media attention, the bloody struggle in Somalia has gained a unique propaganda status. U.S. involvement will demand some form of long term policy decisions. If the U.S. is able to disarm the various Somali factions, the U.N. will probably assume the responsibility of rebuilding the country's infrastructure.

In the meantime, disconnected offensive operations by U.S. forces currently deployed to Somalia have begun to resemble Vietnam tactics. Searching out and destroying various weapons caches and subduing "unfriendly" tribes or provincial areas that are later abandoned can only lead to a deteriorating situation. Hegemonic powers committed to any military operation must use overwhelming force to remove quickly all opposition and eliminate the ability of aggressors to resist. The U.S. is attempting a half-answers, while hoping for a mediated solution. As a hegemonic power it must now finish the job it started and press international organizations to reestablish a government while providing humanitarian aid.

The Yugoslavian conflict has also drawn media attention. Its proximity to Central Europe has caused great concern among Western Democracies. The failure of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as the European Community and its moribund military arm, the Western European Union, to act in this situation serves to support the conclusion that neither a pure collective security nor a multi-polar system is able to act decisively. When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible, a lesson which can not be ignored in constructing a possible future international organization designed to control and use power.

The U.S. is gradually becoming more deeply involved in the Yugoslavian war. The current incoherent policy of air-delivered food drops is an unacceptable course of action. The first thing the U.S. should do is use all diplomatic means possible to end the fighting while avoiding the use of force. U.S. mediators should become directly involved, to bring factional leaders to the negotiating table. The media can be effectively used to this end by exposing atrocities by all combatants. The very real possibility of a third balkan war requires this minimum type of intervention. Perhaps the various factions will exhaust themselves long enough to negotiate a settlement permitting U.N. forces to establish a peacekeeping operation characterized by demilitarized zones. These zones should then be occupied by forces similar to the Multinational Forces operating in the Sinai. If the situation begins to escalate, it is the position of this writer that the U.S. should immediately intervene militarily to forestall Turkish and

Greek involvement by insuring the independence and territorial integrity of Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia.

At some point, whether or not tangible realistic results can be achieved, the moral conscience of the Western Democracies will demand that action be taken to stop these wars. Ethnic, tribal, and religious wars are often characterized by extreme hatred. Eventually they break down the very fiber of society, reverting entire nations to a virtual "stone age" existence. A significant majority of people within liberal democratic nation states believe some form of intervention is required to stop irrational and hopeless carnage.¹⁷ They are motivated by strong beliefs grounded in western religious and cultural values. Ignoring the influence they place upon western democratic governments would be unwise.

Realists would disdain such a perspective. But words have meaning! To expound the ideals of freedom, equality, and righteousness without supporting their meaning is unconscionable. There should be no illusions about the outcome of intervention in any war. Religious and ethnic hatred will continue to result in hundreds of tragic conflicts. But U.S. leadership should not abrogate its responsibility to attempt negotiated solutions. The hatred will remain, but a sincere effort to reduce its effects, should be made.

WEAPON STATES:

Probably the most dangerous and immediate challenge facing U.S. hegemony is the emergence of several aggressive and erratic "weapon states" caught up in vicious cycles of hatred and revenge.

Some of these nations are in the process of developing weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, or chemical. The proliferation of missile technology might allow these rogue states to propel deadly warheads anywhere on the planet. This development by unstable nation states will adversely affect the vital interests of the U.S. and, concomitantly, Western Europe.

A concerted effort should be made to deny technology to such states. Strict controls should be placed on those countries already possessing weapons of mass destruction. If these attempts fail, military steps should be taken to disarm them. There should be immediate development of an antiballistic missile system to defend against existing weapons.¹⁸ America's resolve to act decisively in the face of these dangerous and unstable regimes will be closely watched by other governments and ethnic or religious groups. Any faltering in purpose or lack of willingness to disarm rogue weapon states may well be seen as a sign of weakness and be perceived as a decline in American power. The continuous existence of "mini-weapon states," runs the risk of condemning the system of international relations to regional or global anarchy.

In the process, however, there should be no illusions about "solving" age old hatreds and rivalries. But the U.S. should remain involved by limiting technology, offering negotiating forums and positions, all while manipulating economic and political influences. Ultimately military action should be considered, preferably in concert with allies, to eliminate dangerous and unstable nations which have not responded to diplomatic, political

or economic pressure. If the U.S. is unwilling to provide the leadership in this endeavor, it will weaken its hegemonic position and will risk credibility. The inevitable tendency to form a purely multi-polar system will increase causing a loss of political and ideological power. Rogue "Weapon States" will feel free to destabilize various regions without fear of retaliation.¹⁹

REEMERGENCE OF RUSSIA:

Looking further into the future, a far more serious and long-term challenge faces the hegemonic position of the United States. Russia's return to the political and military scene is only a matter of time. A revitalized Russia will move to claim its rightful place in the international system. How long the recovery will take depends on how rapidly they can reconstruct their culture and society.²⁰ The "velvet" revolutions of Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union were only the first step in a series of violent struggle for power, wealth, and liberty. The initial peaceful revolutions within the former Communist states were actually rebellions of spirit, denying the atomization of society by a Communist tyranny.²¹

These spiritual or cultural revolutions are almost complete. They are inevitably being followed by savage religious, ethnic, and political revolutions. As the old regimes collapse, they are being replaced by moderate governments attempting to establish liberal, democratic, constitutional states. Historically, the leaders of moderate successor states are almost always swept from power. They lack the ruthlessness to deal with new political groups vying for

power, and they lack the radicalism to lead it. The moderate leaders of the successor states to the former Soviet have been unable to concentrate or expand their power. Brutal counterrevolutionaries will soon use force to regain power. They will seek to stop the expansion of political participation and reestablish the old "order".²² This struggle will very likely tear apart the very fabric of the former Soviet Union's social and economic systems.

The destruction of the successor state's aging industrial and remaining social infrastructures will significantly delay their recovery. Entire ethnic groups or nations may simply cease to exist. Other states with abundant natural resources and large populations will rebound if ethnic and religious tolerance, and cultural homogeneity can be achieved. Russia and Ukraine are two such examples and will likely recover within the next 10 to 20 years.²³

The relationship between a recovering Russia and the United States during the next decade is critical. The U.S. should develop a policy of interventionism and continued U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia to help insure that Russia and Eastern Europe's new governments and citizens are more aligned with western liberal democratic values, ideals, and principals.²⁴ Most importantly, the United States, and Europe must lead the effort to rebuild the emerging democratic successor states of the former Soviet Union. Economic aid is important, but a "human investment" is even more important. Management and technological assistance in running

businesses, establishing responsive government, and operating a fair judicial system based on the "rule of law" will do more than any financial aid program to influence positive change in these nation's cultural and societal values.²⁵ Only the combined assets of the Western Democracies can provide the talent, expertise, and educational power to begin the effort of reversing the course of Russian and East European totalitarian history.

Isolationists will argue that the costs are too great and that the U.S. has no vital interest beyond its borders. But the fact remains that at this time the United States is the dominant military, economic, and ideological power in the world. If it does not acknowledge this leadership role and pay the costs of providing stability and security in an effort to mold the future with democratic principals and values, no one else will.²⁶ This fact was made perfectly clear during the Gulf War of 1991, and is evident in the Somalia and Yugoslavia tragedies. It is imperative that counterrevolutions in the former Soviet Union never achieve legitimacy. The U.S. in concert with its Western European allies must act quickly and decisively to influence events.

The philosophical form of U.S. and Western European leadership and influence must be capitalist in nature, liberal in trade policy, and democratic in its politics. It must be conceited, somewhat hedonist, and populist in culture if it is to be successful in molding a new Russia. The principals of free trade and the "rule of law" should be the basic philosophical guide. Russia and other developing and emerging nation states must be

convinced that these values are essential for survival.²⁷ Only then will the return of Russia and possibly Ukraine to the power table be a peaceful event.

The challenges of controlling numerous wars, rogue "weapon states", and the reemergence of powerful successor states of the former Soviet Union will test the resolve of the U.S. and other Western Democracies actively engaged in international relations. The cumulative effect of combining their efforts into a new international relations system and a new organization which together are suited to control power on a global scale is essential for success.

A NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SYSTEM

What about the future? Will the pressures, challenges, and costs of trying to control international anarchy weaken or diminish the current U.S. hegemonic position? There is evidence that the U.S. may already be slipping from its hegemonic role. A true hegemonic power would not need to request monetary or troop support from allies as the U.S. did during the Gulf War. Moreover, U.S. influence has proved powerless against other international concerns such as AIDS, famine, drug trade, and new destabilizing migration patterns. These last concerns are of a global nature and reveal the limits of U.S. hegemonic control.

If the U.S. is losing its hegemonic position, there is a real risk in nation states forming a purely multi-polar balance of power system.²⁸ Many nation states feel threatened by a truly hegemonic United States, and continuously attempt to undermine its dominance.

An affinity for a multi-polar system is a natural reaction by states to anarchy and insecurity. They seek stability through regional alliances and treaties. But a multi-polar system will be unable to control the increasing number of tribal, ethnic, and religious wars because of a diffusion of power as more and more economic and military alliances form. The division of military and economic power among numerous actors may lead to indecisiveness. Leadership will be lost. Nation states will refrain from intervening politically, economically, or militarily knowing full well they do not have sufficient power to prevail.

A reemergence of this type of an alliance-oriented multi-polar balance of power system should be resisted. From the Peace of Westphalia until the end of WWII, the multi-polar balance of power system failed to prevent wars. There is a concomitant danger in the formation of a multi-polar balance of power system. If there is a lack of central leadership, members of the system would tend to gravitate toward an organizational structure found in collective security systems like the U.N. or the defunct League of Nations. This tendency should also be resisted. As membership in the multi-polar system grows, nation states will attempt to gain power and prestige within the system, demanding equality for all members. This would doom the system to a reliance upon numerous nation states agreeing on every action to be taken. The system would be as incapable as previous collective security systems to harness the military, economic, and trans-national nature of power.

Leaders of the strongest states must be willing and have the

authority to act in concert without waiting for unanimity. Their authority must be complimented by sufficient talent, style, and intelligence to make another nation "want what it wants", in contrast to "ordering" it to do what it wants. In this respect, the position of such leaders and statesmen as Colin Powell, Charles Krauthammer, Richard Nixon, Jane Kirkpatrick and George Bush is visionary. The United States must provide the worldwide leadership to control all the elements of power while the U.S. maintains its hegemonic position.²⁹ Only in this way will the tendency for the international system to degenerate into a collective "insecurity" system be prevented.

The ability of the U.S. to dominate the international system will become more difficult as other states develop economically and militarily. In the past, hegemonies with relatively small military forces could easily overpower an aggressive second or third world state threatening its neighbors. Today, the ability of a hegemonic U.S. to provide this kind of stability and security is far more difficult and expensive. The example of the U.S. soliciting monetary support for Desert Storm exposed the gap between America's military might and its resources. It seems clear that the U.S. will need some direct economic assistance from other states as well as transnational actors to maintain the stability of the international system.

Social mobilization, nationalism, and media involvement have made it more difficult and expensive to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states. These factors also expose the gradual

erosion of the importance of military power as a predictor of political and economic outcomes. The U.S.'s ability to effectively respond to all types of crises will be diminished by its relative loss of economic and political dominance. It will therefore seek assistance in operations requiring emphasis on these powers.

Inevitably, no matter how fervently the U.S. tries to maintain its hegemonic position, it is likely that a hybrid of a multi-polar system and the current hegemonic system of international relations will develop after the turn of the century. The hybrid would be multi-polar economically and politically, but militarily hegemonic. This system of international relations has never existed before.³⁰ The combination of these systems requires greater levels of mutual dependence, but may result in more power available to control international relations within the hybrid's area of influence. This is an important concept. By combining the best parts of the multi-polar and hegemonic systems power at the international level gains the same "cumulative" effect found at the national level. Members of the system must understand and be able to effectively use this unique benefit of combining powers. In order to do this a new definition of power is needed which take cognizance of all the major elements of power.

AN EXPANDED DEFINITION OF POWER

Significant conventional military firepower has been purchased by many nations, especially in the Middle East. Does this mean they possess real power? Other elements of power are becoming available to developing countries and private actors such as large

corporations. Are they capable of changing international outcomes in their favor? The answer is complex. While military power is essential, it is becoming more difficult to use. Trade, technology, and education are becoming more useable in manipulating national or international decisions. As the hegemonic system succumbs to the pressures of mutual dependence and gradually develops into the hybrid system previously described, its ability to control power and provide a stable and prosperous environment will depend on balancing and integrating all the elements of power. A clear and measurable definition of power may not be possible, but an understanding of its multidimensional characteristics is essential.

In the past, large and effective military forces were considered the singular and most significant element in any power equation. A current definitional model of power has three levels or dimensions. The apex of this new power model remains military strength. However, there are tremendous costs associated with maintaining the ability to project decisive military power. Military power, therefore, is supported by the economic and industrial structures of the modern democracies. If one were to picture this part of the power model, it would consist of three pillars--each pillar representing the world trading blocs of Europe, the United States, and Japan. The third, and final part of the new power model is its foundation. The foundation is made up of non-governmental trans-national actors such as international businesses, humanitarian organizations, unions, and cartels.

The "soft" or "cloudlike" influences of culture, education, technology, communications capability, etc., mentioned earlier are also part of this foundation. These influence, further stabilize, and to some degree, control the layered power structure.³¹ This arrangement is the most difficult to define, and therefore, the "softest" part of the power model. Being inchoate, however, does not mean that the trans-national actors and cultural influences of a society are not important. It is no accident that the power model herein described has as its foundation the "soft co-optive" powers.

The various parts of this base are growing in importance due to technological developments, faster and more graphic communications, environmental concerns, the growth in the importance of education, and the increasing influence of international law.³² Education of the world's citizenry ranks among the most important factors in understanding and measuring "soft" power, and it may well define the future success of any great power.³³ As nation states educate their citizenry, and create specialized industrial economies, a large middle class develops. This group provides the basis of an informed electorate. The proliferation of democracies with large middle classes is a relatively recent development. The result has been political stability as long as this middle class remains "satisfied."³⁴ It must be remembered, however, that all major revolutions in history have been initiated or caused by middle class dissatisfaction. Once a large middle class has developed providing a base for

democratic government, leaders must seek to understand their economic and political interests. This concept applies in the international environment as well. A large, prosperous, and educated middle class is essential for the successful international maintenance of stability and security. One of the central goals of the future system of international relations should be to provide opportunities for nations to establish middle classes through education and economic opportunities.

The power model defined here offers a description of the expanding nature of power. This multidimensional power model only begins to identify the complex nature of power in the world today. If a hybrid system of international relations is able to combine the hegemonic military powers of the U.S. with the economic and transnational "soft" powers of all the western democracies into an organizational structure designed to aggressively pursue its values and institutions, it is likely that for the first time, the world may achieve long term stability and security.

The establishment of a new international organization would assist in achieving this goal. No new system of international relations or its power control mechanism is likely to operate successfully no matter how much hard or soft power it wields without a responsible organization to manage and exploit its cumulative collection of powers.

A NEW ORGANIZATION

To contend with the eventual reemergence of Russia, the expanding nature of power, numerous factional wars, ideological

changes, and the formation of a hybrid system of international relations, a new international organization is needed to maintain stability and security. An Atlantic Common Market and Alliance (ACMA) should be created. ACMA should be a hybrid organization, combining successful existing international organizations to operate a globally influential system of international relations. All the elements of power previously discussed will need to be managed. ACMA would be constructed using parts of the European Community as well as other economic and defense organizations. The following is a brief description of its proposed basic structure.

The new organization should be first and foremost built on the foundations of an expanded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) created during the November 1991 NATO summit meeting in Rome.³⁵ These organizational structures will form the foundation for the "overarching" Atlantic nature of ACMA, by involving the U.S. and Canada. The nascent NACC will provide the former East Bloc countries limited access to NATO's security system while giving them a forum to begin their political assimilation into Western Europe. It is imperative that the rights and privileges of NACC members be expanded as they meet standardized and flexible rules governing their behavior. As NATO and the NACC grow, the decision making process within the organization should be changed to avoid the indecisiveness common in large, and politically diverse organizations. This could be achieved by creating a hierachial structure with the U.S. providing military leadership, but co-equal

or secondary status on economic matters.

The Military Council of NATO, as the supreme military body within ACMA, should be stratified on the lines of the United Nations Security Council. Final votes on the use of military force would be limited to the "great powers," i.e., Russia, Great Britain, United States, Germany, and France. It is also imperative that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization area of responsibility be expanded to include "out of area" missions in support of ACMA's goals. As an important precedent, NATO foreign ministers approved the use of NATO forces for peacekeeping operations outside of the alliance's formal boundaries in June 1992, but only at the request of the Conference of Security and Cooperations in Europe (CSCE) which virtually assures a request will never be made.³⁶

The Europeans' desire to work through the CSCE or the French designed and cherished Western European Union is a "non-starter."³⁷ The CSCE has 52 members, and unanimity is required to take any type of action. This results in a complete inability to reach decisions on any issue, let alone use of military force. The CSCE is, after all, only and purely a "conference or diplomatic" entity incapable of making conflict decisions.³⁸

The security arm of ACMA must not be a "conference" type system unable to make decisions. Built on a NATO foundation, it would offer the ideal compromise between a hegemonic/multi-polar hybrid system and the rigidity and indecisiveness of a collective security system. The organization would be broad enough to discourage smaller alliances and large enough to provide security

and stability on a global scale. Moreover, if Europeans take on more of the responsibility of running and providing a large portion of ACMA's conventional forces, it should be possible for them to command ACMA's designated units.

The second part of ACMA would be the organization's political and economic structure and would involve the absorption of the European Community and the CSCE into ACMA. It would also require the admittance of the United States, Canada and Mexico as full economic members with some form of representative political status. This arrangement would be essential to combine the economic, political, and cultural powers of Europe and the United States. Furthermore, the absorption of the North Atlantic Free Trade Association into ACMA would guarantee closer U.S.-European ties and insure future successes for the worldwide General Agreement of Trade and Tariff negotiations.

The combination of these organizations would insure a credible three-dimensional power base with overwhelming military and economic power while it's numerous trans-national actors could infiltrate other states and systems to provide ACMA with growing markets.³⁹ The synergistic or "cumulative" effect of combining North American and European markets with an effective military organization would expand the influence of liberal western democracies to the rest of the world in a dramatic way. Free market opportunities combined with the "rule of law" would stimulate trade and ensure growing and stable markets for all nation states.

Japan, essentially ignored in this discussion, would not be invited to join this new organization. It is essential that everyone in the world not be allied with everyone. "No one would have a special relationship with anyone."⁴⁰ Japan should develop its own Pacific Rim system of power in which the United States may participate as a secondary player. Two separate powerful organizations would also help to insure that the most ruthless nation states would not be able to dominate the international system. It is possible, however, as these major regional systems gain wealth and power, a future worldwide organization could be formed, which would be able to slowly incorporate such areas as South America, Africa and India.

In ACMA, the U.S. would initially provide the credible military forces and interventionist leadership as well as significant economic and cultural input. The expanding economic power of Germany would have a balancing power for the Deutsche Mark in the form the U.S. dollar providing a stabilizing influence for other European economies. "America's position in such a system would be similar to that of a medieval king in a feudal society: the sole sovereign with a recognized monopoly of force, but reliant for levies of both troops and money upon powerful barons to whose opinions he therefore paid a decent regard."⁴¹

This new "Atlantic Plan," must nurture and support the new Eastern European states including Russia. It should insure that upon their return to the power table their society, economy, and military leaders hold the same values as the federation of nations

controlling ACMA.

Only an organization as comprehensive as ACMA would have the "public goods", such as providing economic opportunity, stability and other benefits to society available to assist in the rebuilding of eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union. It would control 58 percent of the worlds industrial production and possess overwhelming military power while leading over 1 billion citizens into the twenty-first century. It is a logical and aggressive answer to the failures of past organizations which failed to incorporate mechanisms to control not only military power, but also economic and cultural powers as well. ACMA would have the ability to achieve the desired "cumulative" effect, not just on a regional scale, but globally. The resultant stability and security would stimulate free markets and democratic principles.

CONCLUSION

The United States is at a crossroad in international relations. Involvement in foreign affairs is becoming more difficult to justify as its citizens try to imagine a threat to their well being and see none. Resistance to involvement should be countered by a concerted effort by the U.S. government to keep its electorate informed on the risks of isolationism to the national security and economic prosperity. Ignoring developments in Europe and Asia will lead to the eventual exclusion of the U.S. from trading opportunities and a leadership role, as other nations seek power and wealth at the expense of the U.S. It is essential that

the United States remain involved in international politics and economics, molding the contours of power in favor of capitalist and democratic principals.

This paper has addressed the changes in the system of international relations and has identified the U.S. as a dominant power in the world. As its main thesis it justified the continuation of a some form of a uni-polar or hegemonic international relations system with the U.S. providing the necessary strong central leadership for the foreseeable future in order to allow time for emerging nation states to establish democratic regimes, control rogue "weapon states" and assist former Communist countries recover economically and culturally.

For purposes of analysis, it has greatly oversimplified many issues of critical importance while trying to emphasize the importance of U.S. leadership in providing stability in the world. The paper concludes that the ultimate development of a hybrid multi-polar/hegemonic system will likely provide an expansion of power gaining a desired "cumulative" effect. But the hybrid system will also result in a degree of loss in leadership and decision making ability present in a hegemonic system. This loss in leadership is regrettable. However, it may not be destabilizing in a future international environment where democracies have begun to thrive and free market principles have resulted in improving economic conditions as an outcome of the short-lived U.S. hegemony.

Finally, this paper has suggested the creation of an international organization to operate the future hybrid system of

international relations. This proposal is central to the successful maintenance of global stability and security because it emphasizes the importance of combining the most influential nation states and all the elements of power into a single organization. The enormous economic, religious, and cultural forces released by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resurgent forces of ethnic nationalism worldwide can only be controlled by a powerful and prosperous Atlantic Common Market and Alliance willing to intervene at all levels to restore order or insure free market development. The vital and survival interests of the Western Democracies will be secure well into the twenty-first century if the liberal western democracies take this bold step.

A historical opportunity exists for the Western democracies to change the direction of the world politically, economically, and ideologically. That opportunity should be aggressively pursued. A hybrid international relations system cooperating through a dynamic organization such as the Atlantic Common Market and Alliance may appear to be only a dream, but the same thoughts must have gone through the minds of many great leaders as the world passed from one important era to another. If theory and history, science and art, and the determinate and the indeterminate are combined under the "rule of law," long term stability and security is possible.

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¹⁰John O'Sullivan, "James Burnham and The New World Order," National Review, 5 November 1990, 49.

¹¹Samuel P. Huntingdon, "The U.S.--Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs 67 (Winter 1988/89): 84.

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¹⁴James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, Inc., 1981), 85.

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²⁰Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy no. 88 (Fall 1992): 66-68.

²¹Richard Pipes, "Russia's Chance," Commentary 93, no. 3 (March 1993): 28.

²²Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 264-74.

²³Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 48.

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²⁵Henry A. Kissinger, "Clinton and the World," Newsweek, 1 February 1993, 46.

²⁶Ted G. Carpenter, "The New World Disorder," Foreign Policy no. 84 (Fall 1991): 27.

²⁷John O'Sullivan, "James Burnham and The New World Order," National Review, 5 November 1990, 49.

²⁸William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (America and the World 1990/91): 39.

²⁹Powell, 32.; Nixon, 305.; Jean Kirkpatrick, "Inaugural Address Leaves Us in Dark Over Foreign Policy," Harrisburg Patriot News, 24 January 1993, sec. B, p. 11.; and Bush, 91.

³⁰Paul Johnson, "Wanted: A New Imperialism," National Review 14 December 1992, 28-29.

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³²Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organization 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 725-53.

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